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Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963
Supreme Court Review 211, 215, 219-29 ,:,
(Jerold H. Israel is Professor of Law at the University
of Michigan.)
[C]oncern over the Court's manner of overruling a past decision
raises some basic questions concerning judicial craftsmanship in
overruling opinions. What special functions, if any, should the Court
seek to accomplish with an overruling opinion? What techniques of
opinion writing have been used in the past to fulfill these functions?
Did the majority opinion in Gideon (372 U.S. 335) fail to perform
the proper function of an overruling opinion? Would it have done so
by giving Betts (316 U.S. 455) a "more respectful burial"? These
are, of course, questions concerning method, not result. Admittedly,
as Dean Rostow recently pointed out in answering current criticisms
of the Court's craftsmanship, "opinion writing is only one phase of
the judicial craft
not the whole of it nor even its most important feature." Yet, as even the Dean acknowledged, opinion writing remains a "vital phase" of the judicial process. It is, moreover, a
phase which, if the frequency of separate opinions is any indication,
causes great concern within the Court itself.
Although only occasional opinions by individual Justices have expressly recognized this special problem of the overruling case, an examination of the opinions for the Court in these cases suggests that it
has not been overlooked. The Court over the years has employed certain "techniques" in overruling opinions that, as a general pattern,
tend to preserve the impersonal qualities of the judicial process by
emphasizing factors other than the vicissitudes of changing personnel.
1. Changing conditions.-Even those Justices most opposed to
overruling constitutional decisions have acknowledged that the "law
may grow to meet changing conditions" and that the doctrine of stare
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decisis should not require a "slavish adherence to authority where
new conditions require new rules of conduct." It is not surprising
therefore that overruling opinions in several cases have emphasized
the changed circumstances brought about by the passage of time. Indeed, this technique was employed in one of the earliest overruling
decisions, The Genesee Chief (12 How. 443) which rejected a unanimous holding of the Court decided only twenty-four years earlier in
The Thomas Jefferson. (10 Wheat. 428) Chief Justice Taney's
opinion for the Court in The Genesee Chief refused to follow the prior
ruling that the national admiralty jurisdiction was limited, in accord
with English common law, to waters that "ebbed and flowed." After
stressing that the "great and growing commerce" on inland waters had
made the extension of admiralty jurisdiction to non-tidewater areas a
practical necessity, he noted that The Thomas Jefferson had been decided "when the great importance of the question as it now presents
itself could not be foreseen." The earlier decision had been rendered
in 1825, "when the commerce on the rivers of the west and on the lakes
was in its infancy, and, of little importance, and but little regarded
compared with that of the present day." Accordingly, while the
Court was "sensible of the great weight" to which its prior decision
was entitled, it nevertheless could rightfully overrule The Thomas
Jefferson, since the reasoning there was clearly inapplicable to the
contemporary situation.
Subsequent overruling opinions relying upon changed conditions
have emphasized new developments in areas far less pragmatic than
the commercial traffic involved in The Genesee Chief. In Brown v.
Board of Education, (347 U.S. 483) for example, the Court cited the
change in the status of public schools since Plessy v. Ferguson, as
well as the present state of scientific knowledge about psychological
developments of children. Indeed, the growth of knowledge concerning various aspects of economic and social development has been a
fairly common point of emphasis in those opinions that have rejected
prior precedent on the ground that "time and circumstances had
drained [the overruled] case of vitality."

Reliance upon the "changed conditions" argument logically should
permit an overruling opinion both to reject a precedent and at the
same time acknowledge its correctness when originally decided. The
Court has never gone quite this far, however, although at least one
opinion intimated that the writer might have accepted the overruled
case under the circumstances applying at the time of its decision.
(370 U.S. 530, 543) More often, the Court simply has taken no position as to the validity of the rejected case. But even where the Court
does suggest that the overruled decision was incorrect, an opinion emphasizing the changed circumstances naturally will contain the counter-suggestion that, in any event, the former Court might well have
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decided differently if confronted with today's conditions. Thus, with
the change-in-circumstances rationale, the Court may obtain the best
of both worlds. Not only is the prior decision overruled, but the adverse emphasis upon differences in the Court's personnel that normally attends such action is eliminated, or at least diluted, by relying
upon grounds consistent with that concept of impersonal decisionmaking ordinarily supported by stare decisis.
2. The lessons of experience.-Closely related to the change-incircumstances rationale is the argument that a prior precedent may
be rejected when it has failed to pass the "test of experience." The
Court has frequently acknowledged that "the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function." This willingness to make adjustments in the light
of the "lesson of experience" has been cited as at least a partial
ground for overruling precedent on several occasions. In most cases,
the overruling opinion based the rejection of the earlier decision upon
the administrative difficulties and uneven results revealed by its application. In other instances, however, experience in the application
of a rule has been used to show the erroneous nature of the factual or
policy assumption upon which it was based. In Mapp v. Ohio, (367
U.S. 643, 651-52) for example, the Court noted that the experience of
various states had revealed the error in the supposition that remedies other than the exclusionary rule could effectively deter unreasonable searches and seizures.
In relying upon the "lesson of experience," the Court has once
again tended to depreciate changes in its personnel as the cause of
the change in the law by either the outright suggestion or, at least,
the insinuation that the present result was one that its predecessors
might well have reached if they had had the same information, derived from experience under the rule first promulgated. This role of
the "experience" rationale may be accentuated by the reminder that
"courts are not omniscient" and that "judicial opinions must yield to
facts unforeseen." On occasion, it may be further implemented by
the conclusion that the result of applying a particular doctrine has
been exactly the opposite of that intended by the earlier Court and
that the achievement of this original objective can in fact be accomplished only through reversal of the original decision itself. Of
course, reliance upon difficulties experienced in the application of the
overruled case will lose much of its effectiveness in deemphasizing
shifts in the Court's composition when such difficulties were readily
foreseeable at the time the problem was first decided. Yet, even
here, there remains the remote possibility that problems that may not
have seemed very serious when contemplated in the abstract might
well have caused a reversal of position when faced as a matter of
practical reality.

Ch. 6

THE OVERRULING PROCESS

137

3. The requirements of later precedent.-In the majority of
overrulings, the opinions have been based upon neither changing conditions nor the lessons of experience. They have relied simply upon
the "error" of the earlier decision. Only a small number of these
opinions, however, have relied solely upon the force of reasoning now
considered superior to the rationale of the overruled case. The Court
generally has attempted to buttress its position by showing that the
rejection of the overruled case was required, or at least suggested, by
other, later decisions basically inconsistent with its earlier ruling.
Examples of the use of this technique in overruling opinions are extremely varied. While most of the "inconsistent precedent" has been
found in cases dealing with the same problem as the overruled decision, the Court occasionally has relied upon rulings in related areas
that, while not directly questioning the overruled case, could be treated as having "impaired its authority." In Mapp v. Ohio, for example, the majority opinion pointed to the basic inconsistency between
the Court's refusal to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence and
the required exclusion of all coerced confessions, irrespective of their
reliability. Similarly, in Smith v. Allwright (321 U.S. 649) the
Court found that its decision in United States v. Classic (313 U.S.
299) holding that a party primary could be an integral part of the
election machinery subject to congressional regulation under Article
I, § 4 "call [ed] for a re-examination" of its holding in Grovey v.
Townsend (295 U.S. 45) that the action of a political party convention in excluding Negroes from a primary election did not constitute
state action.
Overruling opinions also have differed in their treatment of the
inconsistency between the earlier ruling and the later precedent. In
some cases the Court has acknowledged that the decisions could be
reconciled, but found it necessary to overrule the earlier decision because the basis of distinction between the cases was not justifiable in
terms of the function of the legal principle involved. More often, the
Court has maintained, sometimes in the face of obvious distinctions,
that it has no choice but to overrule the earlier decision, since that
ruling is totally irreconcilable with subsequent cases. A variation of
this approach has been employed in those opinions overruling a principle that had been sharply limited by a long series of cases creating
numerous exceptions to its application. In such instances, the overruling opinions, after noting that the later decisions already had
"stricken the foundation" from the original case, have asserted the
result as merely "a logical culmination of a gradual process of erosion." On occasion, the Court has even gone so far as to declare that
its previous decision already had been overruled sub silentio by the
"tide" of later cases.
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No matter which of these variations is utilized, the mere presence of these previous decisions indicates that the Court's ruling is
not the result of a sudden shift. On the contrary, particularly where
the authority of the ovenuled case was gradually undermined by a
series of decisions, the Court may properly emphasize that the downfall of the overruled case was not the product of a "little coterie of
like minded justices" recently appointed to the bench, but of a long
line of judges who, over the years, participated in the various undermining decisions. This quality of borrowing support from the past
also provides what is probably the primary value of the "inconsistent
precedent" rationale: a court can overrule a decision while purporting to follow the principles of stare decisis. In pointing to subsequent decisions basically at odds with the case to be overruled, the
Court places itself in a position where it must choose between two
lines of authority. It must either overrule a precedent or "disregard
a contrary philosophy expressed in a later case." Moreover, where
the inconsistent precedent consists of a group of later cases showing
a continuous trend away from the original decision, the Court has
suggested that it really has no choice but to follow the path of subsequent decisions and overrule the original case. As one opinion put it:
"No interest which could be served by
rigid adherence to
stare dffisis is superior to the demands of a system based on a consistent application of the Constitution." In fact, carried to its limits,
the argument based upon the force of subsequent decisions has permitted the Court to disclaim the responsibility for anything more
than the formalistic burial of a case already dead.
4. The place of the 01;erruling art.-Changing conditions, les~
sons of experience, and inconsistent later cases clearly have been the
basic grounds of overruling decisions. There are very few such cases
in which the Court has not employed one or the other. A description
of the rationale of overruling opinions would not be complete, however, without mentioning certain other factors commonly emphasized
by the Court. Overruling opinions, particularly those relying upon
the inconsistency of later decisions, frequently have attempted to depreciate the precedent value of the overruled case even as of the time
it was decided. Thus, the opinions often have noted, and sometimes
stressed, that the overruled case was decided by a divided Court.
Similarly, attention has been focused on the fact that the particular
context in which an issue was originally presented had prevented the
Court from giving to it the "deliberate consideration" normally afforded significant constitutional issues. Still another point emphasized in overruling opinions
has been the unavailability of
a lesser ground that would permit the Court to reach the correct result without overruling its prior decision. Although these factors do
not themselves furnish an independent ground for reversing prior de-
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cisions, they may effectively supplement the primary arguments
based upon changed conditions, experience, or the effect of later cases. The image of the overruling process presented in the Court's
opinion still rests, however, essentially upon the use of these basic rationales.
In this regard it should be emphasized that while these arguments obviously improve that image by minimizing the importance of
alterations in the Court's composition, they are not mere facades put
forth as a matter of good public relations. Differences in viewpoints
between present and past members of the Court obviously are important, but changed conditions, the lesson of experience, and the
course of later decisions are relevant factors that do and should have
considerable bearing upon the Court's determination to overrule a
prior decision. As the Court has frequently recognized, the principles of stare clecisis still have some applicability in the area of constitutional law. There remains, at the least, a presumption of validity
that attaches to the conclusions expressed in prior opinions. Of
course, this may be overcome by a finding that the opposite result is
clearly the correct one, but the assumption that the later Court thus
has obtained "a knowledge and wisdom
denied to its
predecessors" naturally carries with it a certain uneasiness. Any
doubts of this sort, however, may be substantially lessened if, in addition to the arguments supporting its position, the Court can depreciate the views of its predecessor by showing either that they concerned conditions far different from those of today, that they were
made without the information gained through experience in their application, or even that they stand against the tide of the views expressed by other courts over the years. Thus, in relying upon these
factors, the Court has merely followed the standard policy of attempting to present the strongest case for the result it has reached,
which, in this instance, involves showing not only the reasonableness
of its own views but also the inappropriateness of following the contrary views expressed by its predecessor.
The basic patterns of reasoning traditionally employed in overruling cases, therefore, are consistent in all respects with the proper
objectives of the judicial opinion. Of course, this is not to suggest
that these rationales are suited to every case. There have been overruling decisions, like The Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall. 457) and Rabinowitz v. United States (339 U.S. 56) so patently based on the
changes in personnel that no explanation for the overruling other than
the difference in the views of the Justices originally in the majority
and their successors could reasonably be offered. ( It might be noted
in passing that neither of these sudden shifts in position did much to
enhance the Court's reputation among the bar, and The Legal Tender
Cases actually "shook popular respect for the Court.") But where
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these justifications for disregarding precedent are applicable, they
should be employed in the interests of both the logical persuasiveness
of the Court's position and the maintenance of the profession's confidence-and through it the public's confidence-in the impersonal and
principled qualities of the judicial process.

